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Abstract
The aim of this article is to test the theory that the United States considers the policies of
countries in need of international aid when deciding whether to provide economic or military
aid to those countries . To test this hypothesis, this study statistically analyzes the votes cast
in the UN General Assembly for the period of 2005 to 2014. On the basis of this analysis,
some conclusions are drawn regarding the Ukraine’s attempt to receive assistance and
probable causes as to why the theory may not hold for short time periods.
Keywords US foreign policy, the United Nations, foreign aid, voting index, Ukraine crisis,
US foreign policy in Europe
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political influence of the United States in
the new world order has not always ensured security in former Soviet countries. In 2013, a
prolonged crisis would begin in the region, as Ukraine’s preparations for an agreement with
the EU were suspended by then-president Viktor Yanukovych. In 2014, a series of protests
and violent encounters between protesters and riot police culminated in a revolution and
wide-scale unrest, including, ultimately, the ousting of the Ukrainian president and
government and a Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory.1 These events called into question
the legal framework of European security and underscored existing political tensions
regarding the regional balance of power. Both the EU and the countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)2 looked the other way as Russia invaded
Ukrainian territory, violating the Helsinki Accords3 (which were drafted in 1975 and which
proclaimed the inviolability of borders). Also violated was the 1994 Budapest
Memorandum—signed by the US, the UK, and the Russian Federation, providing security
assurances against the use of force against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Thus, 2014 saw
a series of threats to the international security system and, in particular, a series of threats to
Ukrainian sovereignty and security.
The roots of the Ukrainian crisis go back to the historical struggle for Ukraine’s
political and cultural independence between Ukraine and Russia, as the latter had been
occupying most of the territory of modern Ukraine for several centuries. Thus, the current
conflict, started by the Russian occupation of Crimea, is based on centuries-old identity
issues that have been re-invoked by Russia's actions, with potentially long-reaching
consequences for both sides. Despite several years of Ukrainian pleas for American
assistance against Russia, it was not until 2018 that the US provided such aid. Before that, the
White House carefully sidestepped Ukrainian entreaties for aid, citing a concern that the US
not be drawn into the Ukrainian crisis.
The purpose of this article is to explain why the US did not provide military aid to
Ukraine for such a long time, even in the face of Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty
and invasion of Ukraine’s borders—in violation of international agreements that the US
presumably purports to uphold. For this purpose, a statistical analysis was used for
quantitative assessment and objective interpretation of the calculations of the voting
similarities between the US and Ukraine in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). For a more
complete examination, in the first part of the essay, we look into the history of the method; in
the second part we describe our model, and finally, we discuss the results, comparing them
with other studies on this topic.
Theoretical Framework
Studies of the dependence between the conduct of a country and its receiving of
foreign aid from other countries have a long history. The issues of influence of state behavior
on its receiving of aid were investigated in such works as Richardson (2014) and Signorino
and Ritter (1999), while the issues of military assistance were investigated in such works as
T. Schelling (2008) and J. Sislin (1994). The findings of these works were controversial and
sometimes mutually exclusive. In this paper, we present another model that tests the
relationship between voting in the UNGA and military aid from the US over a ten-year time
span.
The idea that the granting of international aid is grounded in politics gained popularity
among scholars in the 1960s. The political theory of neorealism argues that states choose
models of bilateral relations that are based on the previous conduct of the other states
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(Keohane, 1965). For example, state A may support state B based on state B’s previous
political support or assistance of state A. Likewise, state A may deny aid to state C if state C
previously stymied or blocked the political agenda or efforts of state A. A series of studies
was conducted to test this hypothesis.
The work of Wittkopf (1973) deserves primary attention. In 1973, Wittkopf sought to
verify the assumption that the United States used foreign aid as a political tool. To do this, he
compared the results of voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly from 1962 to
1967 to the allocation of foreign aid. According to his logic, the more often developing states
voted identically to the world’s leaders, the greater the amount of aid developing countries
received. For his purposes, Wittkopf used indexes to determine whether there was a common
link between the distribution of aid from donor states and the voting patterns of recipient
states. Wittkopf concluded that the hypothetical link between aid and voting was found only
in the case of the United States. At the time, it remained unclear whether a close voting
relationship between the US and a recipient nation was the cause or the consequence of
receiving aid. And the question remained whether the nature of such aid was meant to be a
reward, bribery, or stimulation of some sort.
The answers to these questions were given in the work of Kul B. Rai (1980). In his
article, Rai demonstrated a model that confirmed the use of foreign economic assistance as a
tool of political influence for promotion of national interests. Rai used the data of polls for
the period of 1967 to 1976 in an attempt to determine the nature of foreign aid: was it an
inducement, reward or punishment? In his work, Rai came to the conclusion that economic
aid was used more as an incentive than as a punishment. However, Rai’s study4 did not
explain the causal relationship between foreign economic assistance and the voting of the
General Assembly.
The tradition of studying the effect of voting on the aid obtained was continued by
Armstrong (1981), who tried to explore the possibility of one country inducing other
countries to pursue a certain line of policy in order to gain economic and military assistance.
She focused on the attitudes of the USSR and the USA toward 24 countries on the basis of
economic exchanges. The author assumed that a country with limited economic resources
would be more vulnerable to pressure than other countries. To test this hypothesis, the voting
patterns for 16 years were taken and divided into four time periods. The researcher came to
the conclusion that US military aid did have a major impact on the pattern of political
compliance, particularly between 1954 and 1970, while economic aid had a negative effect
on compliance. Thus, Armstrong concluded that there was a positive correlation between
military aid and compliance and that there was no clear link between economic aid and
voting.
The study of P. G. Roeder (1985) used the same logic; after examining 62 states,
Roeder revealed a complex relationship between Soviet assistance and political compliance
during the period of 1960 to 1981. By continuously supplying developing nations with
industrial equipment and highly qualified personnel, the USSR developed great influence in
the foreign policy of developing nations. It is interesting to note, however, that the USSR’s
political leverage within developing countries did not lead to an increase in the degree of
collaborative efforts among those countries.
All of these findings share one fact: They described relationships between states set
against the backdrop of the Cold War. During that period, all countries took into account the
influence of the competing efforts of other Great Powers on issues of aiding, trade
preferences, and organization of political influence. This logic of competition is typical to
any sphere of the Cold War period. The results of studies undertaken after the conclusion of
the Cold War, however, have proved to be less straightforward. For example, the results of
the study of Menkhaus and Kegley (1988) were inconclusive. In their 1988 research, they
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attempted to take into account the effects of the competing efforts of the USSR and the US on
Somalia. They created indexes to determine the dependence of Somalia on foreign aid from
1976 to1980 and came to the conclusion that the analysis of interstate dependencies required
modification.
In 1998, another work was published (Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, 1998) that tried to
use the systematic distribution of aid to explain how US policy is determined at the state
level. Having investigated the distribution of foreign aid from 1977 to 1994, the authors
concluded that the variable of the US military presence had a negative correlation with the
provision of assistance. They also showed that the influence of the US military presence upon
the amount of funding decreased over time.
A new approach was revealed in the study of T. Wang (1999). In it, Wang assumed
that the US government was likely to put pressure on recipient nations only on vitally
important issues. To test his hypothesis, he used data collected in sixty-five developing
countries from 1984 to1993. The results of this study indicated that the US government
successfully used foreign aid to exert pressure on countries during voting in the UN on issues
important to the US administration.
Finally, the last major work is Derouen and Uk Heo (2004). As a basis, they assumed
that if the US was indeed a global hegemon, there should be a link between external
assistance and the US ability to influence the behavior of other states. To test this hypothesis,
data were collected on 76 developing countries for a minimum of a 30-year span for each
country. Their research resulted in the conclusion that similarities in foreign policy between
the US and the developing countries led to the provision of greater economic and military aid.
From these studies, we can conclude that over the course of 40 years, the research of
the relationship between countries’ policies and the granting of aid has provided different
outcomes describing the same phenomenon from different angles. The works reviewed here
serve as the foundation for current research in this area. However, this article’s approach
differs from previous works. We examine a shorter period of time, ten years, which, in our
opinion, constitutes a sufficient period of time since it allows for two US election cycles to
have taken place, decreasing the impact of any differences related to the peculiarities of the
composition of any one presidential administration. We deliberately do not examine a longer
period of time since practice shows that policymaking is a process in which the future does
not depend on the past.5 We also intentionally do not consider the votes made during the Cold
War or those of recorded during the other 90 years of the twentieth century. With the demise
of the USSR in the latter half of the twentieth century, both the global political environment
and the behavior of states have changed.6 Since there are no examples of direct tests of the
original hypotheses suggested by dependency theory in modern conditions, this study seeks
to ascertain this relationship on the basis of data on voting in the UNGA.
Model and Results
In the United States, politics are dominated by a realistic world view, which implies a
rational model of international relations. According to this model, in order to survive, each
state constructs its defense so that no other state can harm its essential interests. All countries
have limited resources and must correlate their priorities with reality. If a country spends its
resources in vain, the country stands to lose its international leadership. Thus, a country needs
a good reason to enter into armed conflict.
According to the research of Karl DeRouen and Uk Heo (2004), there is one main
important factor in qualifying for US aid, namely, the past behavior of the country in need of
aid. Since 1980, the United States has been formally monitoring the voting at the UN. A
country’s voting record serves as a sort of a marker, measuring the level of “acceptable
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votes” (as determined by American standards of behavior), which can be exchanged for help.
Matching voting patterns between the US and another country is interpreted to reflect a
certain degree of matching national interests, which, in practice, has far-reaching
consequences.
Every country must weigh the political benefits of providing military aid against the
potential costs of doing so, which will be unpredictable and potentially grave. In order to
maintain its place of political power and leverage, the US is especially hesitant to offer
international aid (particularly military aid) to countries in which the potential for military
entanglement is high. The US is more likely to grant aid to nations that at a minimum, share
some political alignment with US interests, as demonstrated through its UNGA voting record.
The greater the divergence of views between the US and the countries requesting aid, the less
likely it is that the US will provide weapons to those countries. It is assumed that countries
whose voting patterns are farther from US national interests have national interests far from
those of the United States. The approach undertaken in this study will allow us to determine
whether the United States uses aid as an incentive, a punishment, or a reward for their
political goals.
If a certain interval of votes is stable, it is possible to determine the likelihood of the
US providing aid within a certain period of time or at a certain point in the future. Moreover,
it can be assumed that the cause-effect relations between aid and voting policy will be
retraced. A side result of the hypothesis testing will be an answer to the question whether it is
possible to determine an algorithm for predicting the foreign policy of the US. In other
words, it will show whether there are any indications of the future result of diplomats’ efforts
behind the concrete facts of voting.
When there is a conflict of national interests of the members of the UNGA, the voting
index will reflect the lowest common denominator among the different views of member
states. Therefore, the greater the divergence of views among the member states, the lower the
probability that these states will agree upon a common policy. Moreover, the states whose
preferences in voting are further away from the common average of the region, will, most
likely, be against taking any action. Finally, the index results specify details that may be
useful in describing and explaining the outcomes of political processes in the United Nations.
The counting of votes may show a certain political logic in the vote.
In order to check whether or not the national interests of Ukraine and the US are
likely to coincide, we studied their voting patterns in the UN General Assembly from the 59th
to the 68th sessions (UN, n.d.). In this article, we will use the index, which is expressed by the
following formula:

I

AB
year

1

1
N year

N year

v

A
n year

 v nByear

,

n 1

Formula 1. Index of consistency of votes in the UNGA of countries
AB
Where I year is an index of consistency of votes in the UNGA of countries A and B
A
for year ; N year is a total number of votes for the year; vn year is a value of the n vote of the

country A for year . This quantity takes value of 1 in the case of a positive vote, 0 for a
negative vote, and 0.5 for non-participation in voting or abstinence from voting. When the
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AB
value of index constitutes I year  1, we get identical results of voting in two countries during

AB
the year, while with I year  0 we see their absence.

In this paper, to compare the obtained values of the indexes of conformity of policy of
different regions of the world with the policy of the US, we will use the arithmetic mean
value for the region, as well as the standard deviation. The average value gives an indication
of the politics of the regions on the whole, and the standard deviation shows the extent to
which this policy is consolidated. The use of sophisticated methods of time series is not
applicable in the case of a small sample (ten years). Therefore, to evaluate the relationship
between the index of conformity of voting with the provision of US military aid, we have
used a linear regression analysis. To assess the linear relationship between aid and the index
2

of voting, we used the coefficient of determination R and F statistics. When assessing the
coefficient of determination R , we used the Chaddock correlations: 0.9  R  0.99 ,
2

2

showing a very close relationship; 0.7  R  0.9 , showing a close relationship;
0.5  R 2  0.7 , showing an evident relationship; 0.3  R 2  0.5 , showing a moderate
2
relationship; and 0.1  R  0.3 , showing a weak relationship. This index, to a certain
extent, can quantify the mutual coherence of foreign policy of two countries. It should be
noted that this figure takes into account neither the consistency of voting on specific issues
nor the relative importance of these issues for the foreign policy of the countries. Also,
according to this criterion, one cannot determine the degree of commitment displayed by
Kyiv to specific values important to the United States.
Mutual policy coherence reflects the similarity of national interests. The higher the
coherence in voting between countries, the higher the chance for overlapping interpretations
of national interests. Matching interpretations of national interests allows for the developing
of cooperation between states without the danger of unexpected strategic differences
emerging. In this way, the White House can analyze the voting behavior of other countries,
which is critical for understanding the moods of those countries. Within the frame of
common national interests, political relationships can be conducted more meaningfully. This
reduces or eliminates the cost of interaction and maintaining relationships, helping
policymakers to convey the content of their ideas, thereby creating and maintaining a
common vision, which would be impossible without shared views. With fewer barriers, there
is more space for the organization of mutual aid. Thus, the common interests act like
scaffolds of buildings, providing support for separate units of foreign policy. Another
comparison would be the template used for drawing the lines of political behavior. In
practice, this can lead to a more accurate selection of the countries with which to cooperate.
2

Calculations
In order to trace the degree of coherence, we have built index ranks. We used the
voting data in the UN General Assembly from the 59th to the 68th session. First, we built
index ranks of voting coherence between Washington and Kyiv (see Table 1). Based on the
votes, we can see a clear trend of gradual convergence of views between the two countries on
international issues. In 2005, the index was around 0.20. After that time, with the 2008 global
financial crisis approaching, along with a change of government in both countries, as well as
increased dependence on IMF loans, mutual coherence between the US and Ukraine began to
grow. After the parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2012 and the change of the composition
of the Cabinet of Ministers, the level of synchronicity fell slightly, but it still comprised over
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a third of votes. We note that for some years, the level of coherence was almost double that of
2005 (see data for 2012).
Country 1
Ukraine
Country 2
United States
Start with date
2005
Year
Count Matches
Index
2005
67
14
0.208955
2006
75
15
0.2
2007
82
23
0.280488
2008
76
22
0.289474
2009
76
22
0.289474
2010
66
28
0.424242
2011
71
25
0.352113
2012
69
29
0.42029
2013
74
25
0.337838
2014
63
23
0.365079
Table 1. The index of voting coherence in the UN General Assembly between
Ukraine and United States.
In order to understand the significance of our results, we calculated the index for
another country that received assistance. In 2011, Egypt began to receive substantial military
aid from the United States, including 12 F-16 fighter jets, replacement kits for 125 Abrams
tanks, 20 Harpoon missiles, and $ 1.3 billion in annual military funding (McLeary, 2015).
While the results of our voting analysis showed a lesser degree of voting coherence between
Egypt and the US than between Ukraine and the US, Cairo received assistance before
Ukraine did. In the case of Egypt, we can see the point at which the number of matching
votes with the US more than doubled (comparing 2005-2006 with 2012-2013). In both 2005
and 2006, there were five votes on which the countries matched. In contrast, in 2012 and
2013, there were 11 and 13 matching votes, respectively. After 2013, however, the US
temporarily cut off aid to Egypt after the overthrow of the country’s first elected president,
which led to the plummeting of the number of common views. Full details are given in Table
2.
Country 1
Egypt
Country 2
United States
Start with date
2005
Year
Count
Matches
Index
2005
67
5
0.074627
2006
75
5
0.066667
2007
82
8
0.097561
2008
76
5
0.065789
2009
76
6
0.078947
2010
66
7
0.106061
2011
71
9
0.126761
2012
69
11
0.15942
2013
74
13
0.175676
2014
63
7
0.111111
Table 2. The index of voting coherence in the UN General Assembly between Egypt and
United States.

Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 10, Number 1

116

From these results, we can assume that there is threshold dependence for assistance
that exists region-wide. For countries of the Middle East, for example, it is hard to
consistently vote in alignment with the US because doing so may entail political
consequences. To test this argument, we also constructed indexes for other countries. We
tracked the voting of both European countries and the countries of Middle East. The results
are as follows.

Figure 1. The index of voting coherency in the UN General Assembly between
European countries and United States.
Western European countries such as France, Spain, and England have a high level of
matching votes with the United States. Thus, we can say that the Western EU countries are
the United States’ most consistently faithful allies.7 Overall, Europe as a whole has a neutral
position toward the US (the average index for the region for the entire period is 0.45). If we
talk about the European Union (EU), the countries of the EU have a consolidated neutral
position. The United Kingdom and Germany have a slightly higher consistency index (0.6). If
we talk about the rest of Europe, excluding the countries of the former USSR, their position is
approximately the same as that of the EU. Regarding the countries of the former USSR, the
position on voting is divided into two groups: (1) members of the EU (including the Baltic
States) and the countries whose policies are consistent with the EU (Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia); and (2) the countries where Russia’s influence exceeds that of the EU. In the
countries of the second group, the index of voting similarity to the US is much lower than in
the rest of Europe.
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Concerning the provision of US military assistance to European countries, it should
be noted that US aid has been provided to almost all European countries except the countries
of Western Europe as well as Russia and Belarus. Linear regression analysis of the
dependence of military assistance on the index of voting in Europe showed that only three
countries (Croatia, Montenegro, Georgia) out of 26 receiving assistance have a significant
relationship (R^2>0.5).

Figure 2. The index of voting coherency in the UN General Assembly between Asian
countries and United States.
Asian countries have a fairly consolidated negative index (the average index by region
for the entire period constitutes 0.26), the exceptions being some countries in the middle East
(Israel, Cyprus, Turkey) and East Asia (Korea, Japan), which have allied relations with either
the US or the EU. Excluding these countries, the standard deviation for Asia does not exceed
0.05. For the countries of Central, South, and South-East Asia, the regression analysis shows
that 6 countries out of 27 have a significant linear relationship between military aid and the
index of voting.
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Figure 3. The index of voting coherency in the UN General Assembly between Asian
countries and United States
Like Asia, Latin American countries generally do not support the policy of the US.
The average index for Latin America for the entire period constitutes 0.265. Central and
South America are fairly consolidated in this regard. For these regions, the standard deviation
of the index does not exceed 0.05. Only Colombia has a moderate dependence on the index of
voting conformity on provided military aid. The Caribbean region has a strong dispersion of
index values from 0.5 to 0.125.
The countries in Africa do not have a clear policy of voting: The voting index ranges
from neutral ~0.5 to negative >0.2. The average standard deviation for the region for the
entire period constitutes 0.095. Only 3 out of 30 countries receiving aid show a moderate
correlation between military aid and the index of voting.
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Figure 4. The index of voting coherency in the UN General Assembly between African
countries and United States
If we take a look at Egypt or Ukraine, both of which fall within the general trends of
voting for their respective regions, the influence of voting on the provision of aid by the US
to these countries is insignificant and unimportant (i.e., when providing aid, some other
factors seem to be principal). On the basis of the indexes, approximately the same can be said
about Vietnam and Thailand. Such states as Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso constitute a
different case. We believe that it is necessary to consider their relationships with the United
States separately.
Overall, we are left with an interesting picture of voting in general. There are very few
countries (including Israel, Japan, Korea, Turkey, and Cyprus) that universally support the
US during UN voting. The majority of European countries maintain a neutral vote with
respect to the US (i.e., with votes matching that of the US approximately 50% of the time).
All other regions have approximately the same range of voting conformity—ranging from 5%
to 20%. The main conclusion is that the dynamics of voting and the general level of
coherence with the US are approximately the same for the most countries, regardless of
region.
Based on this, it could be concluded that for cases such as Egypt and Ukraine, the factor
of voting coherence in the UN is useless. If the original hypothesis (that coherence in voting
determines the likelihood of receiving US aid) were true, then Egypt would not have received
more aid than Ukraine, as Egypt in fact voted more like Syria than it did the US. The only
thing we can say is that the CIS countries probably have an obvious inclination to vote with
the European Union and not necessarily with the US. When taken as a whole, the conclusions
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drawn from this analysis are as follows: There is the voting of the US, and along with it, the
relatively neutral policy of Europe and the consistent support of some countries such as Japan
and Australia. The rest of the countries are, in fact, generally found to be in opposition to the
US and vote approximately identically to each other. This means that the United States’
determination whether or not to grant aid to other nations must be based on other critical
factors.
As a final conclusion, we will point out the shortcomings of our model. Our model
has the same drawbacks as any statistical model, namely that when no correlation is found
between variables, it does not mean that the variables are necessarily independent. It simply
means that the connection between variables may be non-linear. For example, not all UN
votes are of equal importance. Some questions are more important for the US State
Department than others, and it is on the basis of State Department interests that decisions
regarding the granting of US aid are made. Thus, the model is poorly suited for the analysis
of discrete events and needs further improvement, though this does not negate its predictive
abilities.
It follows that the US probably uses the granting of aid situationally. It is impossible
to trace cause-effect relations in regard to the United States on the basis of statistics alone.
We conclude that in modern conditions, the stable interval of votes is unimportant for the US.
Accordingly, using voting conformity alone is not conducive to determining the possibility of
whether or not the US is likely to provide aid to a given nation at a certain point in the future.
Finally, it is hard to identify the common denominator among different views of member
states.
Discussion
Empirical testing shows that the US provides military assistance in the twenty-first
century not only on the basis of voting in the UNGA but also on the basis of other factors. It
is worth discussing what may lie behind these results. Since the quantitative method of
research has a number of disadvantages, such as the tendency to ignore alternative
explanations, give vague predictions, and generate only proven or unproven results, it makes
sense to consider other non-quantitative factors that have been identified in other studies,
which will close the gaps in this study. By comparing the results of different methods, we get
a clearer understanding of the limitations of our approach.8
We cannot use threshold models in our analysis when the agent’s decision depends on
the actions (or inaction) of the surrounding agents, (i.e., on the political factor, or group
pressure). Additionally, the decision whether or not to grant aid may depend on individual
preferences, (i.e., the individual factor, or autonomy agent) (Granovetter, 1978), as specific
characteristics of each region force the US to consider each case individually. Our research
on the voting patterns of many countries of various geographic regions allows us to conclude
that the United States’ decision to provide military aid to Ukraine does not solely depend on
Ukraine’s voting patterns in the UNGA. In fact, most countries of the same region vote the
same way, and as such, voting cannot be used as a single predictor for military aid.
Some authors (Carter & Stone, 2015) have attempted to prove that since the mid1980s, US law has required the State Department to report how countries vote in the UN on
issues that are regarded as important to US interests and has required USAID to use
countries’ voting records on these issues as a criterion for disbursing aid.9 Such authors point
out that while their results indicate that US policy influences other countries’ votes, they also
acknowledge the limits of that influence. While the important resolutions that the United
States supports generally pass, these represent a small minority of important votes, and
resolutions that the United States opposes almost always pass as well.
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The fact that before 2018 the US did not provide military assistance to Ukraine is,
most likely, not accidental. Our empirical test indirectly confirms the conclusions of Krause
(1991) that the US uses military aid to prevent regional shifts in power in a direction that
would bear negative consequences for the US. We also believe that in the current
environment, the US’ calculated use of military aid is by far not an encouragement, and it is
clearly not a punishment. In addition, our calculations have confirmed the findings that US
aid stabilizes countries (Gray, 2014; Jones & Tarp, 2016).
A number of scientists (Chin & Quadir, 2012; Rist, 2002) have documented changes
in the mode of providing aid, which can indicate, first and foremost, changes in the
approaches of states providing aid. For example, while the US previously supplied weapons
for geopolitical reasons (Lebovic, 1988; Poe & Meernik, 1995), now, as Bachmann’s study
(2014) shows, use of military force is applied more rationally at the international level.
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) and De Ree (De Ree & Nillesen, 2009) have also shown that
financial aid can be presented as latent military assistance, as this type of assistance may be
used on military spending.
We can assume that the current American administration, which finally provided aid
to Ukraine four years after the revolution began, was motivated to do so in part by the notion
that events in Ukraine would no longer immediately jeopardize US national-security
interests: “National security does not exist in a vacuum,” writes international security expert
D. Kaufman. “It is rather defined in terms of international and domestic situation” (Kaufman,
McKitrick, & Leney, 1985). Prior to 2018, the context in terms of sending weapons to
Ukraine was not very favorable. From 2014 to the 2018, the administration of White House
was more concerned with the situation in countries that were of more significant international
concern. In 2014, public opinion polls in the United States indicated that the problem of the
threat of an Islamic state (ISIS) prevailed by significant margin (84% vs. 44%)(Swift, Art, &
Dugan, 2015).
Changing US public opinion further complicates the decision of White House foreign
policy. For example, in 2014, less than one-third of Americans (32%) supported sending
weapons to Ukraine—though there were not many of those who were against, either—37%
(McCarthy, 2015), indicating that the crisis in Ukraine was low on the public’s radar. The
research demonstrates that intervention is more attractive if the potential costs to the
reputation of the president are low. If voters understand American foreign diplomacy and
peacekeeping efforts to have been a failure, that may lead to a lower approval rating of the
incumbent party (Albornoz & Hauk, 2014; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011;
Salehyan, 2010). This indirectly coincides with the conclusions of David Brul and Alex
Mintz, who argued that American presidents tend to refrain from using force when public
support for doing so is less than 50 % (Brulé & Mintz, 2006).10,11
According to Bachmann (2014), the use of military aid sometimes becomes more
rationalized at the international level. For example, the US may change its position and ship
arms to any nation if there is a long history of assistance programs in that nation, as was the
case in Egypt (Berger, 2012). Egypt is also an important ally in the fight against terrorism,
and other countries (e.g., Pakistan) also received aid exactly on the basis of safety issues
(Boutton, 2014; Steinwand, 2014).12 In addition, countries typically only provide aid if they
are sure that it will be used effectively (Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Dietrich, 2013; Winters &
Martinez, 2015).
Another important factor affecting the dilemma whether or not to supply weapons is
the nature of the news media vis-à-vis the conflict in question. In the summer of 1993, Bill
Clinton granted aid to Somalia. A great number of people asked why the United States
assisted in Somalia and did not do the same thing in many other parts of the world, such as
Sudan, where there was a similar situation. Aronson believes that the news media played a
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key role (Pratkanis, Pratkanis, & Aronson, 2001). Numerous pictures of starving Somalis
were shown so often on American television that it caused a massive public outcry for
assistance, which was subsequently transformed into political decision. Thus, the selective
signposting of the news media implies that communications media not only inform citizens
about what is happening, they also affect policy.
There was no clear-cut picture of the situation in Ukraine in the global mass media.
An analysis conducted by Weflive on the basis of the Twitter messages of the president of
Ukraine during the Davos meeting showed that the audiences actually seeing the Ukraine
president’s texts included 56% of Ukrainians but only 13% of Russians, 7% of Americans,
2% of Germans, 1% of Canadians, 1% of Poles, 1% of the French, and 1% of the British
(Weflive, 2015). It is this small-scale news media focus and very low coverage of the
situation in Ukraine among foreign audiences that reduced the responsiveness of foreign
nations. Such a context hurt the chances for a timely organization and disbursement of
weapons to Ukraine.
Thus, neither the internal nor external circumstances were helpful for the White
House to organize the weapons supply to Ukraine. In addition, historical experience shows
that it is difficult for the US to confront a country with which it has close political and
military ties (Russett, 1963). In this case, US co-operation with Russia in antiterrorism efforts
was an important factor in Washington’s hesitation to involve itself in the conflict in Ukraine.
The US continued to hesitate despite the fact that Russia continued to supply weapons and/or
military aid to nations against which the US was fighting. For example, in the summer of
2014, Russia agreed to supply Iraq with military weapons including Mi-28N Night Hunter
attack helicopters, Carapace-C1 anti-aircraft missile systems, and Su-25 attack aircraft
consignment, few artillery and mortar divisions. The total amount of the contract was more
than $1 billion (Kornilov, 2015). Similarly, in 2015, under agreements with Afghanistan and
Russia, Russia delivered 45 versatile helicopters to Afghanistan, where American forces were
combatting the Taliban.
Dual solutions in Washington provide evidence of the possibility of a disunified
government, for which it is difficult to adopt a consistent line, leading to a decrease in
international cooperation. This leads political decision-making to a deadlock, which, in fact,
causes the paralysis of foreign policy on a particular issue, because the US government
cannot fully control its efforts to solve international problems.
An additional difficulty for the US administration is that the problem of needing to
contain the threat posed by ISIS conflicts with the negative consequences resulting from
trying to ease tensions between Ukraine and Russia. In other words, easing the situation in
one direction will cause it to deteriorate in the other. The White House can either balance the
controversial issues, settling for a compromise (for example, by supplying only ballisticproof jackets but not weapons), or it may refuse outright to solve one problem in favor of
another.
Any country might understandably be hesitant to provide assistance if the price of
such interference is high (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Lai, 2003). When providing aid, countries
take into account not only the costs of doing so but also the potential benefits it may bring
(Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009a, 2009b; Faye & Niehaus, 2012). In the case of Ukraine,
while the benefits may have been unclear, one of the potential costs to the US was Ukraine’s
inability to repay its loans. Owing to an ailing economy, Ukraine would not be able to repay
the steep debts incurred to such influential international corporations as Boeing, Airbus,
Embraer, Goodrich, SNECMA, Rolls Royce, or Pratt & Whitney.13,14 But by this logic, Egypt
will be remain an important market for US goods and is likely to remain a close supporter of
the US (Berger, 2012).
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Some external circumstances have also not worked in favor of a quick supply of
weapons to Ukraine, one of which is Russia’s global financial power. Russia is the largest
player in the market of weapons. Every seventh company from the hundred listed in the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) military expenditure database is
of Russian origin, and their sales are increasing every year. At the disposal of Moscow is a
full range of modern weapons, which may be provided to those who will accept its
conditions. According to Moscow’s strategy, in protracted conflicts, the one more likely to
gain the upper hand is the one who has less expensive means of suppressing the enemy’s
means of attack. And Russia is a world leader in this issue.
Another important factor that delayed US aid to Ukraine had more to do with US
interests themselves than with Ukraine itself. This factor, which is reflected in the work of
Doug Bandow, the senior scientific employee of the US Cato Institute, is the attitude of the
current officials to their obligations and the interests of the states for which they work. As he
asserts, “Alliances should strengthen the security of the United States, rather than forcing
charity in other countries. US foreign policy should be based on the interests of America and
not other countries” (Bandow, 2015). According to this expert, because the conflict between
Ukraine and Russia bears no relation to Washington, the weakening or threatening of
Moscow will not be in the United States’ best interest. In other words, the US recognizes the
dangers of supplying weapons to a conflict in which the arms provided may be used in
unexpected ways at unexpected times for unexpected purposes.
For the country that is the supplier of weapons, there is always a political risk of
retaliation. This risk may be justified in two cases: (1) if the benefits of relationships
fermenting in one area are successfully balanced in another region, or and (2) if the country
where the weapons are to be supplied has a high position in the global division of labor.
Studies of the bureaucratic dimensions of American decision-making on the organization and
disbursement of aid results in the drawing of contradictory conclusions (Yanguas & Hulme,
2015). On the one hand, the importance of the US legislative bodies is emphasized (Fleck &
Kilby, 2006; Milner & Tingley, 2010); on the other hand, there are studies that prove the
importance and influence of the media and lobbying groups (Lieberman, 2009; Marrar, 2008;
Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). A number of studies have also shown that Congress is more
inclined to vote for the provision of aid if it has more left-wing senators (Brech & Potrafke,
2014)—and is further inclined to do so if the assistance to be provided is multilateral (Fleck
& Kilby, 2010). In short, the reality is that the US line of providing aid has never been
consistent (Masaki, 2016) and as such, cannot be accurately predicted.
To the extent that the United States’ political interests and allies are relevant, we
should also emphasize the dependence of the US on its European allies concerning the issue
of weapons supply to Ukraine. The European Union uses its own system of requirements for
the provision of aid (Crawford, 2001), consisting of economic measures and political
demands related to the respect for human rights (Stokke, 2013). This strategy is aimed at
changing the behavior of other states through the calculations of costs and benefits (Lehne,
2012). Analogies with the question of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons show that
in cases of split opinions among the allies, Washington adopts a wait-and-see attitude that can
last for years.
Conclusion
Statistical predictions in politics are instruments that are rarely able to predict crucial
events in the international arena for more than a few months. Statistics in international
processes are incredibly inconsistent. It is very difficult for experts to identify causal
relationships solely by analyzing voting statistics. Since political scientists are responsible for
the data they provide and the conclusions they draw, they are well aware of the difficulty and
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the danger of using a poorly understood set of relationships and processes to isolate a single
element of interest. Secondly, political policy is constantly changing, so any interpretation of
national interests suitable for one election cycle may be inapplicable to another. And thirdly,
statistics alone do not reflect the entire picture. The variables that are leading indicators in
one case may wane in importance in another. Finally, the fact that the variables have some
statistical correlation between them does not mean that one variable necessarily influences
the other. In total, these factors, which no one is able to control and which distort the possible
results, can become a source of blindness.
As an interim conclusion, from the results of the study undertaken here, we can assert
that the theories that claim it is possible to determine who will provide aid to whom at a
certain point in the future on the basis of the interval of voting are fundamentally incorrect. It
may be that the theory of vote-matching works poorly for short periods of time and works
better in the long term, when national interests are the same for 20 years or more, which
makes them a priori obvious and proven factors. However, US foreign interests do not
generally remain unchanged for that length of time. We assert further that we cannot trace
any precise cause-effect relations between voting and the granting of aid. In addition, we are
unlikely to find any algorithm to predict US foreign policy on the basis of voting dynamics.
In any UN vote, the US most probably goes by situational considerations concerning the
content of a particular document. As such, theories attempting to predict US foreign policy
are misguided.
Notes
1

Opposition to the revolution in some eastern and southern Russophone regions escalated into the Russian
invasion and annexation of the then-autonomous Ukrainian region of Crimea.
2
The Commonwealth of Independent states, formed in 1991, includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.
3
The tenets of the Helsinki Accords called for the mutual acknowledgment of sovereign equality and the respect
of the rights inherent to sovereignty. The accords also called for the refraining from the use of force or threat of
force and proclaimed the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of states and encouraged peaceful
settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and respect for human rights. All of
these principles were violated in the Ukrainian revolution.
4
One methodological detail: Rai’s study was conducted at the time of the Cold War, when there was tough
competition between states with different ideologies and different economic models. In addition, Rai’s work
only dealt with the economic assistance; countries that did not receive any American aid in a given year were
excluded from the study.
5
Otherwise, we would have seen a succession of administrations implementing the same policies and an
absence of any irregularities in the evolution of foreign policy.
6
We would like to point out that the studies cited here did not take into account the degree of tension
surrounding certain issues or the importance of certain votes, since for implementation of the method of scales,
one would need to know exactly how a specific administration evaluates a particular vote, which is an
impossible task. As such, our study also does not take into account the factor of tension.
7
Yet on some votes, many of these countries had lower levels of matching votes with the US than Ukraine did,
which had the highest number.
8
We exclude some components from the discussion of the research presented by James Meernik (2008) because
there are no US military bases in Ukraine. In addition, given that all countries vote almost identically, we will
waive the bargaining model (Armstrong, 1981; Dippel, 2015; Goldstein, 1995; Keohane & Nye, 1977; Lee &
Heo, 2001; Palmer, 1990; Ray, 1981; Richardson, 2014; Roeder, 1985; Sislin, 1994) because it is not effective
in practical terms.
9
The United States disproportionately uses changes in aid disbursements to manipulate the voting behavior of
poor democracies. Further, to the degree that the legitimacy of UN decisions depends on the democratic
legitimacy of its members, it is unfortunate that US foreign policy systematically coerces the votes of
democracies (Carter & Stone, 2015).

Voting in the UN General Assembly

10

125

US administrations are particularly risk-averse before elections. Public opinion is very sensitive to failures in
the military sphere, and politicians will tend not to create additional grounds for criticism during pre-election
campaigns.
11
Compounding the typical hesitancy of US presidents to get involved in foreign conflicts, the Ukrainians have
no consolidated ethnic community in the United States and therefore wield little to no political leverage, unlike,
for example, the Cubans, who can lobby on their own behalf (Rubenzer, 2011).
12
It is interesting to note, however, that Sullivan, Tessman, and Li (2011) find that higher levels of US military
aid are actually associated with less cooperation from the recipient.
13
Ukraine will likely not be able to buy foreign-made weapons for some time. The world’s annual weapon sales
volume in 2013 totaled more than 402 billion dollars (Blenckner, 2014). However, Fitch Ratings, the
international rating agency, has cut the Ukrainian rating in foreign currency to CC, and for this reason, Kyiv
cannot afford to buy foreign weapons in sufficient volume.
14
One option Ukraine might utilize to increase the possibility of receiving aid, including weapon supply, is to
make an attempt to strengthen strategic ties with the donor state. In this case, Ukraine could make itself look
quite attractive to donor states, as it has a number of natural resources. For example, Ukraine has the world’s
largest known reserves of iron ore, which it could potentially supply to the world markets.
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